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Patterns of Adjustment under the Age of Finance:
The Case of Turkey as a Peripheral Agent of Neoliberal
Globalization

Turkey experienced a severe economic and political crisis in November 2000 and again in
February 2001. The IMF has been involved with the macro management of the Turkish economy
both prior and after the crisis, and provided financial assistance of $20.4 billions, net, between
1999 and 2003. Following the crisis, Turkey has implemented an orthodox strategy of raising
interest rates and maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. The government was forced to follow a
contractionary fiscal policy towards attaining a primary surplus to the 6.5% of the GNP, and
promised to satisfy the customary IMF demands: reduce subsidies to agriculture, privatize, and
reduce public sector in economic activity.
Contrary to the traditional stabilization packages that aimed at increasing interest rates to
constrain the domestic demand, the new orthodoxy aimed at maintaining high interest rates for the
purpose of attracting speculative foreign capital from the international financial markets. The end
results in the Turkish context were the shrinkage of the public sector in a speculative-led growth
environment; deteriorating education and health infrastructure which necessitate increased public
funds urgently; and the consequent failure to provide basic social services to the middle classes and
the poor. Furthermore, as the domestic industry intensified its import dependence, it was forced
toward adaptation of increasingly capital-intensive, foreign technologies with adverse
consequences on domestic employment.
In the meantime the transnational companies and the international finance institutions (the socalled IFIs) have become the real governors of the country with an implicit veto power over any
economic and or political decision that is likely to act against the interests of global capital.
Thereby the fragile Turkish democracy has been placed under siege by the agents of the newimperialism.

Turkey experienced a severe economic and political crisis in November 2000 and again in
February 2001. The crisis erupted when Turkey was following an exchange-rate based
disinflation programme led and engineered by the IMF. 1 Over 2001 the GDP contracted by
7.4% in real terms, whole sale price inflation soared to 61.6%, and the currency lost 51% of its
1

The underlying elements of the disinflation program and the succeeding crisis are discussed in detail in Akyuz and
Boratav (2004); Ertugrul and Yeldan (2003), Yeldan, (2002), Boratav and Yeldan (2006), Alper (2001). See also
the GPN Report on Turkey, 2005 and the web site of the Independent Social Scientists Alliance
(www.bagimsizsosyalbilimciler.org) for further documentation of the crisis conditions.
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value against the major foreign monies. The burden of adjustment fell disproportionately on the
laboring classes as the rate of unemployment rose steadily by 2 percentage points in 2001 and
then another 3 percentage points in 2002. Real wages fall abruptly by 20% upon impact in 2001
and could not recover since then as of the time of writing this report.
The IMF has been involved with the macro management of the Turkish economy both prior and
after the crisis, and provided financial assistance of $20.4 billions, net, between 1999 and 2003.
Following the crisis, Turkey has implemented an orthodox strategy of raising interest rates and
maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. The government was forced to follow a contractionary
fiscal policy, and promised to satisfy the customary IMF demands: reduce subsidies to
agriculture, privatize, and reduce the role of public sector in economic activity.
The post-crisis economic and political adjustments were overseen by the newly founded Justice
and Development Party (AKP) which came to power enjoying absolute majority in the
parliament in the November 2002 elections. Though maintaining the pro-Islamic political
agenda, the AKP nevertheless distanced itself from the previous “national View” orthodoxy of
the traditional Turkish Islamic movement. The AKP refurbished itself with a more friendly view
towards the West, ready to do business with the global finance capital and willing to auctioning
off the strategic public assets to the trans-nationals. On the political arena, the AKP had given
unequivocal support to the US interests in the Middle East including the then approaching war in
Iraq. 2
With a new stand-by on which the existing AKP government reached consensus with the IMF in
2004, the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the Turkish businesses were assured that
the “reform” process would continue up to 2008 along the course set by the IMF’s structural
adjustment programme since 1998. The programme was officially declared as a bundle of
policies aimed at checking increases in both domestic and external debt and channeling the
country again to the path of “stable” growth. However, it is widely known that, beyond what has
been declared officially, the programme envisages much more radical arrangements in
restructuring the political and social life as a whole. It is also common knowledge that the
primary and the most important target of these arrangements is to eradicate public services and
related achievements in the fields of social security, education and health, and to commodify
these services through privatizations. A critical point to be underlined here is that all of the
governments of the recent period, including the AKP, have displayed their “most determined”
political stand (and in turn were hailed as “credible” and “reputable”) together with their full
neglect to reactions coming from the people and the working classes. Taken from this angle, it
will be safe to assert that Turkey constitutes one of the best examples of those societies where
only formal aspects of political democracy are observed and nothing more (ISSA, 2006).
In fact, shortly after it has taken office, the AKP abandoned the discourse manipulating antiIMF and anti-liberal reactions in the country immediately after taking office and showed no
hesitation in fully adopting neo-liberal policies entrusting national resources and economic
future of the country directly to foreign capital and the non-fettered workings of the market.
2

In fact, many analysts draw parallels with the declaration, in the summer months of 2002, of the three-party
coalition government granting no support for the US plans to invade Iraq and the decision to hold early elections
later in the same year.
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The distinguishing feature of the AKP government in this respect was that it has undertaken the
mission of executing the neo-liberal project under the discourse of a “strong government” without
confronting any strong popular opposition (ISSA, 2006; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The AKP had
acted faster and more boldly than any preceding government in implementing the above
neoliberal agenda in attempt to respond to the requests of international capital on the one hand,
and to settle its problem of adaptation to the State and administrative traditions of the country, on
the other.
It is the purpose of this paper to portray the post-2001 crisis adjustments and the warranted
transformations in the Turkish political and economic arena under the auspices of the Bretton
Woods Institutions (The IMF and the World Bank). The exclusive focus is on the
macroeconomics of the AKP period, rather than the evolution of the 2001 crisis per se. The
paper is organized under 4 sections. In the next section an overview of the Turkish
macroeconomic adjustments is summarized with the relevant economic evidence. The section
focuses on the speculative nature of growth with a detailed assessment of the modes of balance
of payments financing under the AKP era. Section II in turn, takes on the joblessness growth
patterns and document data on the labor markets. The deterioration of the position of wage labor
along with its role in generating the necessary economic surplus under the post-crisis
adjustments is documented in Section III. Section IV concludes with a discussion on the political
inferences of the neoliberal reforms of the post-crisis era.

I. Post-Crisis Characteristics of Growth
The current IMF program in Turkey relies mainly on two pillars: (1) fiscal austerity that targets a
6.5 percent surplus for the public sector in its primary budget 3 as a ratio to the gross domestic
product; and (2) a contractionary monetary policy (through an independent central bank) that
exclusively aims at price stability (via inflation targeting). Thus, in a nutshell, the Turkish
government is charged to maintain dual targets: a primary surplus target in fiscal balances (at
6.5% to the GDP); and an inflation-targeting central bank 4 whose sole mandate is to maintain
price stability and is divorced from all other concerns of macroeconomic aggregates.
According to the logic of the program, successful achievement of the fiscal and monetary targets
would enhance “credibility” of the Turkish government ensuring reduction in the country risk
perception. This would enable reductions in the rate of interest that would then stimulate private
consumption and fixed investments, paving the way to sustained growth. Thus, it is alleged that
what is being implemented is actually an expansionary program of fiscal contraction.
The post-2001 growth had indeed been high. Annual rate of growth of real GNP averaged 7.8%
over 2002-2006Q2. Growth, while rapid, had very unique characteristics. Firstly, it was mainly
driven by a massive inflow of foreign finance capital which in turn was lured by significantly
high rates of return offered domestically; hence, it was speculative-led in nature (a la Grabel,
1995). The main mechanism has been that the high rates of interest prevailing in the Turkish
3

i.,e., balance on non-interest expenditures and aggergate public revenues. The primary surplus target of the central
government budget was set 5% to the GNP.
4
The target was set at 5% on consumer price inflation for 2006, and 4% for 2007 and 2008.
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asset markets attracted short term finance capital, and in return, the relative abundance of foreign
exchange led to overvaluation of the Lira. Cheapened foreign exchange costs led to an import
boom both in consumption and investment goods. Clearly, achievement of the fiscal contraction
under severe entrenchment of public non-interest expenditures was a welcome event boosting the
hungry expectations of the financial arbitrageurs. (See Table 1). The second characteristic of the
post-2001 era was its jobless-growth pattern. Rapid rates of growth were accompanied by high
rates of unemployment and low participation rates. The rate of unemployment rose to above
10% after the 2001 crisis, and despite rapid growth, has not come down to its pre-crisis levels (of
6.5% in 2000). Furthermore, together with persistent open unemployment, disguised
unemployment has also risen. According to TURKSTAT data, “persons not looking for a job,
but ready for employment if offered a job” has increased from 1,060 thousand workers in 2001,
to 1,936 thousands by 2006, bringing the total (open + disguised) unemployment ratio to 15.5%
(see Table 6 in section II below).
Together with rapid growth, dis-inflation has been hailed as another area of “success” for the
AKP government. The Central Bank has started to follow an open inflation targeting framework
since January 2006. The Bank’s current mandate is to set a “point” target of 5 percent inflation of
the consumer prices. Inflation rate, both in consumer and producer prices, has, in fact, been
brought under control by 2004. Producer price inflation receded to less than 3% in late 2005.
After the brief turbulence in the asset markets in May-July 2006, inflation again accelerated to
above 10% and could only be brought under control gradually to 9.6% towards the end of 2006.
Despite the positive achievements on the dis-inflation front, rates of interest remained slow to
adjust. The real rate of interest on the government debt instruments (GDIs) for instance
remained above 10% over most of the post-crisis period and generated heavy pressures against
the fiscal authority in meeting its debt obligations. (See figure 1). The persistence of the real
interest rates, on the other hand, had also been conducive in attracting heavy flows of short term
speculative finance capital over 2003 and 2005. This pattern continued into 2006 at an even
stronger rate.
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Table 1. Key M acroeconomic Indicators, Turkey
IMF-Led Post-Crisis Adjustments
IMF-Led
Dis-inflation
Programme

Crisis

Under 3-party
Coalition
Government

Under Pragmatic and W estern-friendly Islamism of the AKP

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

GNP Growth Rate

6.3

-9.5

7.9

5.9

9.9

7.6

7.8

Inflation (CPI, 12 months averages)

54.9

54.4

44.9

25.3

10.6

8.2

9.6 1

Real W age Growth (%) 2

2.1

-20.1

1.1

5.1

3.9

-0.1

1.3

Unemployment Rate (%)

6.5

8.4

10.3

10.5

10.2

10.2

8.8
-0.6 2

Budget balance / GNP (%)

2006.Q3

-10.9

-16.2

-14.3

-11.2

-7.1

-2.0

Non-Interest Primary Budget Balance / GNP (%)

5.7

6.8

4.3

5.2

6.1

7.4

6.3

Central Adm. Domestic Debt (Billions $)

58.0

84.9

91.7

139.3

167.3

182.4

173.1

Central Adm. Domestic Debt / GNP (%)

29.0

69.2

54.5

54.5

52.3

50.3

45.7 2

Total External Debt Stock (Billions $)

118.5

113.6

130.1

144.9

162.2

171.1

198.3

External Debt / GNP (%)

59.3

78.0

71.9

60.6

54.2

47.4

52.4 2

Foreign Trade Balance (Billions $)

-23.8

-7.1

-11.4

-18.2

-30.6

-39.8

-32.0

Exports (fob, billions $)

30.7

34.3

40.1

51.1

66.9

76.7

63.9

Imports (cif, billions $)

54.5

41.4

51.5

69.3

97.5

116.5

95.9

Current Account Balance (Billions $)

-9.8

3.4

-1.5

-8.1

-15.6

-23.1

-25.3

Current Account Balance / GNP (%)

-4.9

2.3

-0.8

-2.8

-5.3

-6.4

-6.7 2

Source: TR Central Bank (www.tcmb.gov.tr); Undersecretariat of Treasury (www.treasury.gov.tr)
1. As of end of 2006.
2. As a ratio of last four quarters.

Inertia of the real rate of interest is enigmatic from the successful macro economic performance
achieved thus far on the fiscal front. Even though one traces a decline in the general plateau of
the real interest rates, the Turkish interest charges are observed to remain significantly higher
than those prevailing in most emerging market economies. The credit interest rate, in particular,
has been stagnant at the rate 16% despite the deceleration of price inflation until the May-July
turbulence. Since then the credit interest rates accelerated to 23.5% (Turkstat, 2006).

Figure 1. Inflation (WPI, 1994 = 100) and Real Interest Rate on GDIs
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High rates of interest were conducive in generating a high inflow of hot money finance to the
Turkish financial markets. The most direct effect of the surge in foreign finance capital over this
period was felt in the foreign exchange market. The over-abundance of foreign exchange
supplied by the foreign financial arbitrageurs seeking positive yields led significant pressures for
the Turkish Lira to appreciate. As the Turkish Central Bank has restricted its monetary policies
only to the control of price inflation, and left the value of the domestic currency to the
speculative decisions of the market forces, the Lira appreciated by as much as 40% in real terms
against the US$ and by 25% against Euro (in producer price parity conditions).
Figure 2 portrays the paths of the bilateral (vis-à-vis the US$) and the trade-weighted real
exchange rate (in PPP terms, with producer prices as the deflator) over 2000-2006. The currency
crises of November 2000 through February 2001 are clearly visible in the figure. The recent blip
in May-July 2006, on the other hand, has had a minimal effect on the real value of the real
exchange rate and did not suffice to change the direction of the course of ongoing real
appreciation.

Figure 2. Indexes of the Bilateral and Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rate
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I-1. Components of Balance of Payments and External Debt
The structural overvaluation of the TL, not surprisingly, manifests itself in ever-expanding
deficits on the commodity trade and current account balances. As traditional Turkish exports
lose their competitiveness, new export lines emerge. Yet, these proved to be mostly importdependent, assembly-line industries, such as automotive parts and consumer durables. They use
the advantage of cheap import materials, get assembled in Turkey at low value added and then
are re-directed for export. Thus, being mostly import-dependent, they have a low capacity to
generate value added and employment. As traditional exports dwindle, the newly emerging
export industries had not been vigorous enough to close the trade gap.
Consequently, starting in 2003 Turkey has witnessed expanding current account deficits, with the
figure in the third quarter of 2006 reaching a record-breaking magnitude of $25.3 billion, or
6.7% as a ratio to the aggregate GNP. In appreciation of this figure, it has to be noted that Turkey
traditionally has never been a current account deficit-prone economy. Over the last two decades
(80s and 90s) the average of the current account balance hovered around plus and minus 1.52.0%, with deficits exceeding 3% signaling for significant currency adjustments as had been in
1994 and 2001. In fact, the mechanics behind the culminating current account deficit of the post2001 period can only be understood in the context of the speculative transactions embedded in
the Finance account of the BOP. Table 2 summarizes the relevant data.

Table 2. Selected Indicators on Balance of Payments and Foreign Debt (Millions US$)
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006Q3

Total over
2006Q3-2003

Exports (fob)

34,373

40,124

51,206

67,047

76,595

63,916

258,764

Imports (fob)

-38,106

-47,407

-65,216

-90,925

-109,171

-95,922

-361,234

Trade Balance

-102,470

-3,733

-7,283

-14,010

-23,878

-32,576

-32,006

Current Account Balance

3,392

-1,524

-8,037

-15,604

-22,852

-25,334

-71,827

Finance Account Balance

-14,643

1,161

7,098

17,679

44,069

34,462

103,308

Foreign Direct Investment by Residents Abroad
Foreign Direct Investment by Non-Residents
Non-Residents' Portfolio Investments in Turkey
Residents' Portfolio Investments Abroad
Other Investment, Net

-497

-175

-499

-859

-1,047

-361

-2,766

3,352

1,137

1,752

2,847

9,650

12,804

27,053
32,781

-3,727

1,503

3,851

9,411

14,670

4,849

-788

-2,096

-1,386

-1,388

-961

-1,284

-5,019

-12,983

792

3,380

7,668

21,757

18,454

51,259

Net Errors and Emissions

-1,759

118

4,941

2,267

1,983

-659

8,532

Change in Reserves (-: Increase)

12,924

212

-4,097

-4,342

-23,200

-8,469

-40,108

113,592

130,093

144,915

162,202

171,078

198,261

68,168

16,403

16,424

23,013

32,569

38,247

43,322

26,898

0.87

0.61

0.68

0.90

0.76

0.74

Foreign Debt Stock
Short Term Foreign Debt Stock
Ratio of Short Term Foreign Debt Stock to Central Bank
Reserves

..

Source: TR Central Bank (www.tcmb.gov.tr)
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Data in Table 2 indicate that the finance account has depicted a net surplus of 103.3 billion over
the “AKP period”, 2003 through 2006 (September). About half of this sum ($151.2 billion) was
due to credit financing of the banking sector and the non-bank enterprises, while a third ($32.8
billion) originated from non-residents’ portfolio investments in Turkey. Residents have exported
financial capital at the magnitude of $5.4 billion, and if one interprets the net errors and
omissions term of the BOP accounts as an indicator of domestic hot money flows (see e.g. 6and
Akyuz, 2004; Boratav and Yeldan, 2005), the total sum of net speculative finance capital inflows
is calculated to reach $36.2 billion over the three years of the post-crisis adjustments.
The foreign direct investment (FDI) is taken as an important source of financing the current
account deficit especially after 2005. It is true that the BOP data reveal a sudden increase in the
flow of FDI monies totaling $22.4 billion in the last two years. However, looking at the FDI
more closely, it would be revealed that the bulk of the aforementioned flow had been due to
privatization receipts plus real estate and land purchases by foreigners. Neither of these items
are sustainable sources of foreign exchange, and they were driven by speculative arbitrage
opportunities rather than enhancing the real physical capital stock of the domestic economy. In
fact as reported by the ANKA researchers, the stock of “hot money” has reached to $52.3 billion
as of August 2006. This stock is fed upon three sources: (i) foreigners’ holdings of government
debt instruments (£17.9 billion) and (ii) of securities at the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market
($30.6 billion); and (iii) foreign exchange deposits at the banking sector ($3.7 billion). The
aggregate stock of hot money reaches to two-thirds of the cumulative current account deficit over
the post-2001 crisis period.
A significant detrimental nature of hot money led balance of payments financing is its foreign
debt intensity. As reported in Table 2, the stock of external debt has increased by a total of $63.5
billion over the end of 2002 to the second quarter of 2006 (the most recent data available at the
time of writing). This indicates a cumulative increase at a rate of 48.8% in US dollar terms over a
period of 3.5 years. Despite this rapid increase, the burden of external debt as a ratio to the GNP
has fallen from 71.9% (2002) to 47.4% (2005). This fall is due to both the rapid expansion of the
GNP and the unprecedented appreciation of the Lira over the period. The appreciation of TL
disguises much of the fragility associated with both the level and the external debt induced
financing of the current account deficits. A simple purchasing power parity “correction” of the
real exchange rate, for instance, would increase the burden of external debt to 76.8% as a ratio to
the GNP in 2005. 5 This would bring the debt burden ratio to the 2001 pre-crisis level. Under
conditions of the floating foreign exchange regime, this observation reveals a persistent fragility
for the Turkish external markets, as a possible depreciation of the Lira in the days to come may
severely worsen the current account financing possibilities. This persistent external fragility is
actually one of the main reasons why Turkey had been hit the hardest among the emerging
market economies in the May-June 2006 turbulence (IMF, 2006).
Another facet of the external fragility of the Turkish balance of payments regards the
composition of debt. As far as the post-2001 era is concerned, two critical features of external
debt driven current account financing have been that, (i) the foreign debt accumulation was

5

Measured in 2002 producer prices. If the PPP-correction is calculated in 2000 prices, the revised debt to GNP ratio
reaches to 82.3%.
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mostly of short term duration; and (ii) it was mostly driven by the non-financial private sector,
rather than the public sector. I document the relevant data in Table 3.

Table 3. Composition of External Debt Stock (Millions US$)
2000Q4

2001Q4

2002Q4

2003Q4

2004Q4

2005Q4

2006Q3

2006Q3 - 2002Q4
Increase

118,504

113,592

130,093

144,915

162,202

171,078

198,261

68,168

28,301

16,403

16,424

23,013

32,569

38,247

43,322

26,898

16,900

7,997

6,344

9,692

14,529

17,740

19,828

13,484

9,748

7,654

8,425

10,461

14,753

17,744

20,897

12,472

653

752

1,655

2,860

3,287

2,763

2,774

1,119

90,203

97,189

113,669

121,902

129,633

132,831

154,939

41,270

(2.1) Public Sector

47,621

46,110

63,618

69,503

73,825

68,114

68,660

5,042

(2.2) TR Central Bank

13,429

23,591

20,340

21,504

18,114

12,654

12,921

-7,419

(2.3) Private Sector

29,153

27,488

29,711

30,895

37,694

52,063

73,358

43,647

7,581

4,789

4,637

5,060

8,284

15,316

21,264

16,627

Banks

4,550

3,211

3,026

3,140

5,750

12,231

17,310

14,284

Non-Bank Financial

3,032

1,578

1,611

1,920

2,534

3,085

3,954

2,343

(2.3.2) Non-Financial Enterprises

21,571

22,699

25,074

25,835

29,410

36,747

52,094

27,020

External Debt Stock (1 + 2)
(1) Short Term Foreign Debt
Banks
Other Sectors
TR Central Bank
(2) Medium-Long Term Debt

(2.3.1) Financial Enterprises

Source: Undersecreteriat of Treasury (www.hazine.gov.tr)

As Table 3 attests, of the accumulated foreign debt of $68.2 billion over the AKP era, 43% was
short term in maturity. Turkey’s external short term debt stock, which had reached to $28.3
billion just before the eruption of the February 2001 crisis, was reduced to as low as $13.7 billion
in the first quarter of 2002. The stock of short term debt has increased rapidly, especially after
2003, to reach $43.3 billion as of the third quarter of 2006. A critical account of this episode
pertain the ratio of short term debt to central bank’s international reserves. This ratio is regarded
as one of the crucial leading indicators of external fragility (see, e.g., Kaminsky et.al., 1999), and
has been interpreted as the “most robust predictor of a currency crisis” in Rodrik and Velasco
(1999). The path of this indicator over the post-2001 period is summarized in the last row of
Table 3.
As the ratio of short term external debt to CB international reserves rise, it signals a “fall” in the
capability of the CB to meet the external liabilities of the domestic economy, and is interpreted
as worsening of external fragility. This ratio stood at 0.87 by the end of 2001 6 , and after
receding to 0.61 in early 2002, rose up to 0.92 by the third quarter of 2005. It is brought back to
0.74 by the third quarter of 2006, thanks mainly to very rapid build-up of foreign exchange
reserves by the Turkish Central bank in the past year. By way of comparison, the
aforementioned “fragility ratio” was 0.60 in Malaysia, 0.91 in the Philippines, and 1.50 in
Thailand just before the break down of the 1997 Asian crisis. Thus, it can be argued that 0.60 is

6

The ratio of short term foreign debt to CB international reserves was 1.47 just before the eruption of the February
2001 crisis.
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regarded as a critical threshold from an international speculation point of view (see, e.g.,
Kaminsky et.al, 1999). 7
The preceding discussion indicates that despite the brief deceleration of the turbulence of MayJune, Turkish economy continued to increase its intensity of external debt accumulation in 2006.
Available data of the first nine months of 2006 is a manifest of this as summarized in Table 4
below.

Table 4. Main Components of the Balance of Payments in 2006 (Millions US$)
Jan - Sept
2005
C u r r e n t A c c o u n t B a la n c e
C a p ita l O r ig in a tin g f r o m F o r e ig n
S o u rc e s
C a p ita l O r ig in a tin g f r o m D o m e s tic
S o u rc e s
C h a n g e in R e s e r v e s ( " - " in d ic a te s
in c r e a s e )

Jan - Sept
2006

D if f e r e n c e

- 1 5 ,8 7 0

- 2 5 ,3 3 4

- 9 ,4 6 4

2 5 ,8 2 1

3 8 ,1 0 8

1 2 ,2 8 7

- 4 ,0 5 2

- 7 ,1 8 8

- 3 ,1 3 6

- 8 ,5 6 1

- 4 ,9 2 7

n .a .

2 ,6 6 2

-6 5 9

- 3 ,3 2 1

N e t C a p ita l In f lo w

2 4 ,4 3 1

3 0 ,2 6 1

5 ,8 3 0

F o r e ig n D e b t In d u c in g C a p ita l In f lo w s

1 7 ,2 9 1

2 3 ,7 0 5

6 ,4 1 4

N e t H o t M o n e y F lo w s

1 1 ,9 5 9

- 1 ,8 6 9

- 1 3 ,8 2 8

N e t E r r o r s a n d O m is s io n s

S o u r c e s : B o r a ta v , 2 0 0 6 ; T R C e n tr a l B a n k .

In table 4 we distinguish the BOP data of January-September 2006 over two axes: first is the
decomposition of the in/out-flows of foreign capital into two sources: by the foreign nonresidents versus domestic residents. Capital inflows originating from the foreign sources are
observed to increase by 48% over the comparable period of 2005, and reached to $38.1 billion.
The domestic source, on the other hand, displayed an out-flowing tendency and had been on the
order of $-7.2 billion. This figure comprises outflows due to operations of the banking sector
and the enterprises, as well as the domestic rentiers’ decisions. Taking account of the net errors
and omissions figure of $-0.7 billion, the overall net foreign capital inflow into Turkey reached
to $30.3 billion, a 24% increase over the same period of 2005.
7

See also Goldstein (2005) for a recent evaluation of the external fragility accross emerging market economies,
where Turkey is reprotedly found to display above average fragility indexes among comparable economies. See
also the IMF’s 2006 report on Turkey for further discussion.
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Data reveal that a significant deceleration of the hot money component of this transfer ($-1.9
billion), as the domestic outflows of hot money had outpaced the speculative inflows of nonresidents. Consequently, the role of hot money financing of the balance of payments is reduced
in the first nine months of 2006. The period further reveals, however, a 37.7% increase in net
foreign indebtedness, to reach $23.7 billion. Given that the public sector is currently following a
strict austerity programme, and has generated a sizable primary surplus, this increase in foreign
debt has originated mainly from the private sector —and mainly by the non-banking, private
enterprise sector (see Table 3). The external debt obligations of the private sector ($73.4 billion)
now exceeds aggregate public foreign debt ($68.6 billion) as of third quarter of 2006.
Within the private sector, non-financial enterprises explain 60% of the aggregate increase of
private external debt over the post-2002 AKP period and accounts for 70.9% of the total stock of
private debt by 2006Q3. (See Figure 3).

Figure 3. External Debt By Sectors
250,000

Total Foreign debt
Public Sector + CB Foreign Debt
198,261

Private - Non-Financial Sector Foreign Debt

200,000

Private Financial Sector For. Debt
170,062
162,240
145,022

150,000
130,206
118,508
113,619

100,000

50,000

0
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2001Q4

2002Q4

2003Q4

2004Q4

2005Q4
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Source: TR Central Bank, www.tcmb.gov.tr

I-2. The “IMF Program”
The rapid increase of private sector debt —both by the financial and non-financial sectors alike,
reveals the true essence of the IMF-engineered adjustment mechanisms following the currency
and banking crises of February 2001. The underlying characteristics of the Turkish post-crisis
adjustments ultimately relied on maintaining high real rates of interest in anticipation of
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increased foreign capital inflow into the domestic economy. Coupled with an overall
contractionary fiscal policy, the programme found the main source of expansion in speculative
inflows of foreign finance. Persistent offerings of high rates of interest against the back-drop of
lower inflation and fiscal primary surplus targets were the main attributes of the IMF programme
as implemented both by the three-party coalition government under Mr. Bulent Ecevit (until
November, 2002) and by the AKP government (post-November, 2002).
The aforementioned elements of this adjustment path were clearly stated, in fact, in the Turkey
Country Report prepared by the IMF staff in late 2001. Table 5 below makes a reference to that
2001 report which had laid out the macroeconomic targets of the post-crisis adjustment path as
envisaged by the IMF. It is very illuminating to note that the targets of the 2001 IMF Report
encompassing 2002 through 2006 have eventually become the official targets of both
governments over that period. The targeted rate of real GNP growth, for instance, was
persistently set at 5% for each coming year, despite the observed rapid expansion of the economy
in rates often exceeding 7% in the preceding year! This choice was clearly no coincidence.
Likewise, the inflation targets of the “independent” central bank each year followed the path
envisaged in the 2001 IMF Report, beginning with 20% of 2003 to 5% in 2006. (Note that the
Turkish CB has declared the onset of its official inflation targeting monetary regime in January
1, 2006).
Finally, the very sanctimonious primary surplus target of the public sector at 6.5% as a ratio to
the GNP clearly finds its origins in the aforementioned report.

Table 5. Macroeconomic Targets of the Current IMF Programme
GNP Real Growth Rate
Non-Interest Budget balance / GNP (%)
Inflation Rate
Nominal Rate of Interest on Domestic Debt
REAL Rate of Interest on Domestic Debt

2002
3.0
6.5
35.0
69.6
25.6

2003
5.0
6.5
20.0
46.0
21.7

2004
5.0
6.5
12.0
32.4
18.2

2005
5.0
6.5
8.0
27.4
18.0

2006
5.0
6.3
5.0
23.9
18.0

Source : IMF, 2001 Turkey Country Report (www.imf.org )

That being said, what remains noteworthy is the IMF’s choice of a very high and persistent real
interest rate targeted at 18% throughout the programming horizon. The real interest rate target is
persistently kept at its very high level despite the falling trajectory of the inflation rate. In
comparison of the Figure 1 above where the realized rates of inflation and real interest were
disclosed, the persistence of the high level of real interest rate against falling inflation rates seem
to find a resonance in the adjustment path assumed by the IMF staff in the immediate post-2001
crisis. It is clear that the main adjustment mechanism of the post-crisis IMF programme was
embedded in maintaining a significantly high rate of real interest. The high interest rates
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attracted short term finance capital; and the relative abundance of foreign exchange led to
overvaluation of the Lira. Cheapened foreign exchange costs led to an import boom both in
consumption and investment goods. Achievement of the fiscal contraction under severe
entrenchment of public non-interest expenditures, in turn, was a welcome event further boosting
the hungry expectations of the financial arbiters.
In sum, contrary to the traditional stabilization packages that aimed at increasing interest rates to
constrain the domestic demand, the new orthodoxy aimed at maintaining high interest rates for
the purpose of attracting speculative foreign capital from the international financial markets.
The end results in the Turkish context were the shrinkage of the public sector in a speculative-led
growth environment; deteriorating education and health infrastructure which necessitate
increased public funds urgently; and the consequent failure to provide basic social services to the
middle classes and the poor. Furthermore, as the domestic industry intensified its import
dependence, it was forced toward adaptation of increasingly capital-intensive, foreign
technologies with adverse consequences on domestic employment. It is to this issue now I turn.

II. Persistent Unemployment and Jobless Growth
Another key characteristic of the post-2001 Turkish growth path has been its “jobless” nature.
The rate of open unemployment was 6.5% in 2000; increased to 10.3% in 2002, and remained at
that plateau despite the rapid surges in GDP and exports. Open unemployment is a severe
problem, in particular, among the young urban labor force reaching 26%. Table 6 tabulates
pertinent data on the Turkish labor market.

Table 6. Developments in the Turkish Labor Market (1,000 persons)
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006Q3

15+ Age Population

46,209

47,158

48,041

48,912

49,906

50,991

51,770

Civilian Labor Force

23,078

23,491

23,818

23,640

24,289

24,989

25,622

Civilian Employment

21,581

21,524

21,354

21,147

21,791

22,566

23,279

Unemployed (Open)

1,497

1,958

2,473

2,497

2,479

2,509

2,343

6.5

8.4

10.4

10.5

10.3

10.2

9.1

1,139

1,060

1,020

945

1,223

1,714

1,936

10.9

12.3

14.1

14.0

14.5

15.8

15.5

Agriculture

7,103

8,089

7,458

7,385

7,400

6,661

6,809

Industry

3,738

3,774

3,954

3,821

3,988

4,360

4,429

Services

9,738

9,661

9,942

10,080

10,403

11,545

12,041

Open Unemployment Ratio (%)
Disguised Unemployment

a
b

Total Unemployment Ratio (%)
Civilian Employment by Sectors

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Household Labor Force Surveys.
a. Persons not looking for a job yet ready to work if offered a job: (i) Seeking employment and ready to work within 15 days, and
yet did not use any of the job search channels in the last 3 months; plus (ii) discouraged workers.
b. Total (open + disguised) unemployment accounting for the persons "not in labor force".
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The civilian labor force (ages 15+) is observed to reach 51.8 millions people as of 2006Q3. On
the other hand, the participation rate fluctuates around 48% to 50%, due mostly to the seasonal
effects. It is known, in general that, the participation rate is less than the EU averages. This low
rate is principally due to women choosing to remain outside the labor force, a common feature of
Islamic societies, but its recent debacle depends as much on the size of the discouraged workers
who had lost their hopes for finding jobs. If we add the TURKSTAT data on the underemployed
people, the excess labor supply (unemployed + underemployed) is observed to reach 15.5% of
the labor force as of the third quarter of 2006.
Yet the most striking observation on the Turkish labor markets over the post-2001 crisis era is
the sluggishly slow performance of employment generation capacity of the economy. Despite the
very rapid growth performance across industry and services, employment growth has been
meager. This observation, which actually is attributed to many developing economies as well,8
is characterized by the phrase jobless-growth in the literature. In Turkey this problem manifests
itself in insufficient employment generation despite the very rapid growth conjuncture especially
after 2002.
To make this assessment clearer I plot the quarterly growth rates in real gross domestic product
in Figure 4, and contrast the y-o-y annualized rates of change in labor employment. In order to
make comparisons meaningful, the changes in labor employment is calculated relative to the
same quarter of the previous year.

Figure 4. Annual Rate of Change in GDP and Aggregate Employment
20.0

GNP Annual real rate of change
Employment Annual real rate of change
15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0
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2002.III

2003.I

2003.III

2004.I

2004.III

2005.I

2005.III

2006.I

2006.III

-5.0

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Household Labor Force Surveys.

8

See, e.g., UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, (2002 and 2003).
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The figure discloses that between 2002.Q1 and 2006.Q3 the average rate of growth in real GDP
was 7.5%. In contrast the rate of change of employment averaged only 0.8% over the same
period. Over the nineteen quarters portrayed in the figure, GDP growth was positive in all
periods. Yet, labor employment growth was negative in 9 of those 19 quarters.
The sectoral breakdown of the post-crisis employment patterns reveals a massive de-population
in the rural economy. Agricultural employment has been reduced by 1,289 thousand workers
since 2001. Against this fall, there had been a total increase of employment in the services
sectors by 2,380 thousand, and by 655 thousand in industry. Simultaneous to this was the overall
expansion of the aggregate labor supply from 47.158 million in 2001 to 51.770 million in 2006,
adding to the acuteness of the joblessness problem.
Thus, in conclusion, two important characteristics of the post-crisis adjustment path stand out:
first is that the post-2001 expansion is observed to be concomitant with a deteriorating external
disequilibrium, which in turn is the end result of excessive inflows of speculative finance capital,
and was named “speculative-led” in the preceding section. Secondly, the output growth contrasts
with persistent unemployment, warranting the term “jobless growth”.
A further detrimental impact of the speculative-led, jobless growth era had been the overall
decline in the labor participation rates. Even though lower than the comparable member
countries of the European Union, labor participation rates were nevertheless above 50% during
most of the 1990s. The participation rate declined to less than the 50% threshold first during the
implementation of the 2000 exchange rate-based dis-inflation programme. It continued its
secular decline over the rest of the decade and its trend is depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Labor Participation Rate and Total Unemployment
54

18

Total Unemployment Rate (%)
16

53

Labor Participation rate

14

12
51
10
50
8
49
6

Participation Rate (%)

Unemployment (%)

52

48
4

2006Q3

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

46
1999

0
1998

47

1997

2

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Household Labor Force Surveys.
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III. Wage-Labor as the Absorber of the Burden of Adjustments
Such a transfer of the financial surplus through very high real interest rates offered to the
financial system would, no doubt, call for repercussions on the primary categories of income
distribution. It is clear that creation of such a financial surplus would directly necessitate a
squeeze of the wage fund and a transfer of the surplus away from wage-labor towards capital
incomes, in general. It is possible to find evidence to the extend of this surplus transfer from the
path of the manufacturing real wages. I portray the dynamics of the manufacturing real wages in
Figure 6, and offer contrasts against productivity of labor.

Figure 6. Real Wages and Labor Productivity in Turkish Manufacturing Industry
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Labor Productivity (per hour worked)
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Real Wage Earnings per Labor Employed (per hour)
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Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT)

The index of labor productivity, measured in real output per hours, shows a rapid increase with
its level reaching to 158 index points (1997=100) by 2006Q3. Over the same period, wage
remunerations, on the other, declined by a cumulative 23.8% in real terms. This exercise shows
very clearly, how in the Turkish economy speculative financial gains were financed through
squeezing of real wages. Each rapid rise in the financial returns has been closely associated with
a downward movement of real wages and involved a direct transfer from labor incomes towards
capital, both domestic and foreign 9 . The real wages contracted severely after the 2001 February
crisis and this downward trend was maintained throughout 2002 and 2003.

9

See also Yeldan (2006) for a more detailed assessment of the labor’s position under the post-crisis adjustments of
the Turkish economy.
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A case can further be made here that the ongoing process of surplus transfer from wage-labor to
the financial-industrial conglomerates is nothing new, and not unique to Turkey, either. Capital’s
assault on labor has, in fact, continued with new forms of industrial organization at the onset of
neo-liberal globalization in mid-70s. With intensified policy changes towards flexibility and
privatization, position of wage-labor eroded everywhere. This process was most visible in the
US, the hegemonic center of global capitalism. In order to depict this phenomenon, I will adhere
to the path of real wages and real labor productivity in US manufacturing in the second half of
the 20th century. (See Figure 7). As clearly visible, the Fordist period under the Keynesian
policies had been associated with real wages following to a large extend the movements in labor
productivity up until 1970s. The late 1970s, however, reveal the extend of capital’s gains against
labor. As the real wage rate stagnated, its path remained significantly below the real average
product of labor, the gap yielding the increased exploitation of wage labor in the last quarter of
the century. 10

FIGURE 7. Labor Productivity and Hourly Real wages in US Manufacturing (1950 = 100)

Hourly average
product of labor

Hourly real
wages

Source: "The New Face of Capitalism: Slow Growth, Excess Capital and A Mountain of Debt"
Monthly Review, editors, 2002. (www.monthlyreview.org/0402.editr.htm)

10

See, e.g., Moseley (2001) and the series of reports by the Economic Policy Insititue on the position of the US
labor.
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A different facet of this observation was at play across the Atlantic as well. Figure 8 below
contrasts the US wage labor’s position with that of Turkey. The figure portrays comparable data
and the verdict remains exactly the same. Wage rates of the Turkish manufacturing labor follow
the average real product until 1980, and under conditions of military dictatorship during the
1980s, a significant wedge is created among the real wage earnings and real labor productivity
by way of intensified exploitation of labor.

Figure 8. Labor Productivity and Real Wages in Turkish Manufacturing (1950-2005)
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Source: TURKSTAT, Annual Manufacturing Surveys.

Clearly very similar processes had been operational both at the North and South under neoliberal
globalization. The end of the Fordist technological organizations led to the demise of the welfare
state which enabled a comparatively tolerant attitude towards wage labor. As this delicate
balance on mass production for domestic consumption eroded, capital has found a new
opportunity in financial returns. Overall this process has led to the demise of the welfare state
and an outright hostile attitude against the rights of labor.
As a result, share of labor in national incomes fell everywhere. According to Petras and
Veltmeyer (2000) and Diwan’s (1999) data, share of wage labor fell from 48% (1970) to 28%
(1985) in Chile; from 41% (1970) to 25% (1989) in Argentina; from 37% (1970) to 27% (1989)
in Mexico; from 40% (1970) to 17% (1986) in Peru. Similarly, according to calculations of
Yeldan (2000, Chapter III) the share of wage labor in manufacturing value added was reduced
from 28% in 1976 to 15% by 1987.
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This abrupt shift in the distribution of income against labor coincided with the assault against
indigenous strategies for economic development and against the fragile democracies of the
“South”.

IV. Conclusion: From “Fiscal” to “Democracy” Deficit
The detrimental consequences of the neoliberal adjustment path on wage-labor were not limited
only to the economic sphere. Labor’s position was further curtailed as the developing country
governments that are dependent upon foreign capital have been conditioned to adopt or maintain
contractionary policies in order to secure “investor confidence” and “international
creditworthiness”. Such efforts are restricted to a balanced budget, entrenched fiscal
expenditures, and a relatively contractionary monetary policy with an ex ante commitment to
high real interest rates. All of this signify reduced political autonomy in the developing world in
exchange for market access to industrialized North, and itself is a bad bargain as far as
development is concerned (Rodrik, 2001).
In this environment portfolio investors become the ultimate arbiters of national macroeconomic
policy (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan, 2000; Grabel, 1996) and any effective public policy is
now regarded as synonymous to populism and waste. Democratic institutions are put under
siege through endless lists of conditionalities set forth by the IMF and the World Bank, and in
the meantime, the transnational companies and the international finance institutions (IFIs) have
become the real governors with an implicit veto power over any economic and/or political
decision that is likely to act against the interests of global capital. The IFIs report rating scores
in aligning the indigenous economies under the strategic realm of finance capital. Even direct
political decisions are under scrutiny.
A critical example here is the rejected war motion by the Turkish parliament, disapproving the
US troops to utilize the Turkish soil in the early days of the Iraq’s invasion. In exchange for a
total aid of 24 billion dollars, USA had asked permission from Turkey to use its borders with
Iraq. The motion was rejected and a chaos ensued driven by the IFIs and their rating agencies.
The following excerpt from Morgan Stanley Economic Forum on Turkey, is a typical example:
(March 4, 2003).
“the latest parliamentary decision to reject the much-debated ‘war motion’ is
such a risk that will no doubt disturb the fragile equilibrium...(Turkey) is
unlikely to get the promised $24 billion that would ease pressure on the
domestic debt market...”
The report concludes with the stunning question:
“what happens if the parliament does not altogether vote for the
economic reforms, arguing that 80% of the Turkish population is
against the IMF program?”
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Thus, the report is not only concerned with the loss of 24 billion dollars liquidity for the Turkish
financial centers, but is also worried that the people may further exercise their rights over the
future of the IMF-led austerity program in Turkey. In the classic words of Diaz-Alejandro
(1985), a twist can also be mentioned: “Good-bye Budget deficits, hello democracy deficit...”.
In the words of the 2005 Annual Report of the ISSA, two important consequences of these
transformations come to the fore as the basic problem of almost all countries including Turkey:
Speaking in broad terms, these are related to the transfer of decisions relating to the public sphere
from constitutional institutions of respective countries to “independent” supreme bodies of
regulation working under global rules and further commercialisation of the public services and the
overall body of public economic activity including decision making and regulation (ISSA, 2006:
4). This process, whose legitimization is presented as “dissecting politics from economics”
enhances the hegemony of global capital and its domestic extensions on society by keeping large
sections of people and working masses afar from political processes. Political leaders in all
countries where these reforms are being implemented commonly refer to clumsily working “old”
state and bureaucratic structures, also lamed by corruption; and the new model is championed by
reference to its so–called efficient, strong, rule-abiding and accountable features. Any reader with
further interest in a more elaborate and advanced analysis of these reforms and the new State in
agenda as well as the new public sphere may refer to any website managed by IMF, WB, OECD or
EU.
Reports containing mentioned policy suggestions not only define necessary measures and
arrangements to be adopted, but also go as far as advising ways of securing public support in this
field. The example below is from an OECD Report (2002) titled Regulatory Reforms in Turkey:
Important Support to Economic Improvement: Governance:
“...It is vital to have open communication channels in order to have continued
public support for the reforms. There is a need for dissemination of the targets and
the advantages of the regulatory reforms. Another benefit of this approach is to
eliminate the widespread public view that the reforms are imposed from abroad.
For this reason, the public perception should be treated as an important issue
within the communication strategy of the government.” (page 11, underlined
emphasis added).
Assessing the processes which the so-called “emerging market economies” have undergone
under the onset of neoliberal globalization, it becomes clearer that what has been pursued is not
simply a stride to “stabilize” the economic structures, but goes much beyond it to radically alter
the social structures of those nations. The executing actors include political circles who shut their
ears to reactions coming from different segments of society, justify their stance by repeating “it
is us who decide on policies to be adopted” and maintain these policies at any cost whatsoever
while keeping themselves content with the slogan “firm commitment is a virtue”. These top level
bureaucrats, whom we can classify as “global elites”, often share the same mode of living and
discourse worldwide. Extremely intolerant to any criticism including very innocent ones, these
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groups may well behave far distant from what can be given as the sine qua non of any
democracy.
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